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Santa Maria Basin Adjudication
• Currently over 1000 parties
• Phase III Statement of Decision entered
May 4, 2004
• Primary issue of Phase III was existence of
overdraft

Statement of Decision
• “The law defines ‘overdraft’ as extractions
in excess of safe yield . . .” (4:10-11)
• “The Court finds based on all the evidence
presented in this phase of the trial that the
Basin is not presently and has not
historically been in a state of hydrologic
overdraft.” (4:8-9)

Statement of Decision
• Court did not quantify safe yield
• Decision rests on absence of “undesirable results”
• “If the court were to exclude . . . the California
Water Project imported water in determining
whether there is overdraft, the court would be
looking at the Basin in a hypothetical sense as
opposedd to
t whether
h th there
th has
h been
b
reall depletion
d l ti
of the water supply in the Basin.” (9:18-21)

Phase IV
• “But a determination of whether or not the
basin is in overdraft is only
y one aspect
p of
the determination of whether or not a party
q
a priority
p
y to underground
g
has acquired
water. There are more claims and
p y a claim
contentions in this case than simply
of prescriptive rights.” (5:2-4)

Central Basin Adjudication
• Stipulated Judgment in 1962
• Currently 148 parties
• Rights to underground storage space not covered
by the Judgment
• Who
Wh owns/controls
/ t l the
th storage
t
space??
• West and Central Basin Water Replenishment
District v.
v Southern California Water Company
(2003) 109 Cal.App. 4th 891, modified 110
Cal.App. 4th 352, review denied.

Rights to Storage Space
• “Appellants claim that ‘the right to use
storage
g space
p
[is]
[ ] an element of their water
rights.’ If that were correct, it would follow
that a p
prescriptive
p
right
g to water necessarilyy
encompasses a right to storage . . .
Appellants’
pp
prescriptive
p
p
interest is in the
use of the water, not in the storage space.”
((109 Cal.App.
pp 4th at 909.))

Rights to Storage Space
• “Appellants’ proposal ensures only that the
Water Rights
g Holders would benefit from
the exploitation of the storage space, either
byy using
g it or by
y sellingg it to the highest
g
bidder . . . The Constitution requires that the
ppublic benefit as well . . . .” (109
(
Cal.App.4th at 913.)

San Gabriel Basin
•
•
•
•

Perchlorate CERCLA litigation
South El Monte Operable Unit (SEMOU)
Aerojet, et al. defendant PRPs
A il 12,
April
12 2004,
2004 A
Aerojet,
j et al.
l fil
file crosscomplaints

Third Party Complaints
• “Aerojet . . . alleges . . . that for over 30 years a
substantial amount of Colorado River water was
imported into the Basin and the SEMOU for Basin
recharge purposes . . . and that such water
contained hazardous
ha ardo s substances
s bstances and that such
s ch
water imported for Basin recharge purposes was
disposed on the ground or otherwise spread or
caused to percolate down into the Basin.” (12:612)

Third Party Complaints
• Aerojet alleges that such contaminated
Colorado River water has been imported to
recharge the Basin as a response to
overpumping of groundwater by various
water
t entities.
titi Aerojet
A j t further
f th alleges
ll
that
th t
the Watermaster and MWD have caused
such contaminated Colorado River water to
be delivered and or spread or disposed in
the Basin. (12:13
(12:13-20)
20)
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Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Reginald A. Dunn, Judge. Affirmed.
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and Appellant.
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Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Richard M. Helgeson, Senior Assistant City
Attorney for Water and Power, Edward Schlotman, Assistant City Attorney and Julie A.
Conboy, Deputy City Attorney, for Amicus Curiae City of Los Angeles, acting by and
through the Los Angels Department of Water and Power.

Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliot, Frederic A. Fudacz and Alfred E. Smith for
Amicus Curiae Upper Los Angeles River Area Watermaster and Main San Gabriel Basin
Watermaster.

This appeal presents two principal issues: who has the right to utilize unused storage
space in the Central Basin, a groundwater basin, and who has the right to manage the
1

subsurface storage space. These issues arise in the context of a motion that sought to
allocate all of the usable storage space to the 148 public entities and private persons with
the adjudicated right to extract water from the basin. The trial court denied the motion.
It concluded that the unused storage space is a public resource, and that the Water
Replenishment District of Southern California (WRD) is authorized to manage it. We
affirm.

1

Groundwater “means nonsaline water beneath the surface of the ground, whether or not
flowing through known and definite channels.” (Water Code § 60015.) Groundwater
basin is “loosely” defined as “an area containing a groundwater reservoir capable of
furnishing a substantial water supply.” (Todd, Groundwater Hydrology (John Wiley &
Sons 2nd ed. 1980) p. 47.) The amount of storage space in a groundwater basin depends
on the subsurface geological formations and the amount of vacant space between the soil
particles. (Foley-Gannon, Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water
Management in California and Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives (2000) 6 Hastings
W.-N.w. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 273, 278-279.)
2
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Parties
Appellants -- the Cities of Long Beach, Downey, Lakewood, Signal Hill, Santa Fe
Springs, Pico Rivera, and Paramount, Southern California Water Company, California
Water Service Company, Montebello Land and Water Company, South Montebello
Irrigation District, and Tract 349 Mutual Water Company – are several of the entities
with the adjudicated right to extract water from the Central Basin. Appellants describe
themselves as “provid[ing] potable water services to more than one million businesses
and residents in western Los Angeles County.” According to Appellants, collectively
they control about 50 percent of the total permissible annual pumping allocation from the
Central Basin.
Respondent WRD was formed in accordance with and is governed by legislation.
2

(Water Code §§ 60000 et seq.) The five members of WRD’s board are elected and serve
staggered four-year terms. (§§ 60080 et seq., 60135 et seq.) With the exception of
powers related to groundwater contaminants, WRD’s power may be exercised only for
replenishment purposes. (§§ 60221, 60224, 60230.) Appellants and the other entities
with the right to pump water from the Central Basin are charged an assessment to finance
WRD’s activities. (§ 60317.)
Conjunctive Use
In Appellants’ view, the core issue in this case is the pressing need for expanded
conjunctive use of the Central Basin. Conjunctive use describes a management
technique, which involves the coordinated use of both surface water and groundwater
resources. (Todd, Groundwater Hydrology (John Wiley & Sons 2nd ed. 1980) p. 371.) It
is the method currently favored by the Legislature (§ 1011.5) and supported by all parties
to this litigation. Benefits of conjunctive use include conservation, reduction in surface

2

All further statutory citations are to this code.
3
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storage facilities, and storage of water for periods of draught. (State of California
Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 118, California’s Groundwater (1975) p.
14.)
In lieu and artificial recharge are two types of conjunctive use projects. In lieu
projects involve using surface water in lieu of pumping water from a basin. (Association
of Groundwater Agencies, A Guide To Conjunctive Use in Southern California (2000)
pp. 6-7.) Artificial recharge requires forcing surface water into available storage space in
an underground basin through percolation ponds or injection wells. (Id. at p. 8.)
In WRD’s view, it already implements conjunctive use projects and litigation is not
necessary to further develop the storage space in the Central Basin. WRD boasts of
having restored over 250,000 acre feet of water to the Central Basin. However, even by
WRD’s own estimates, as of September 2001, less than two percent of the Central
Basin’s storage space was utilized.
The Central Basin
The Central Basin extends approximately 277 square miles, underneath mostly urban
or suburban land. (State of California Department of Water Resources (October 2000)
WaterMaster Service in the Central Basin, p. 9.) Currently, 148 entities, including
Appellants, have the right to extract water from the Central Basin (collectively Pumpers
or Water Rights Holders). These entities include cities, municipalities, water companies,
school districts, individuals, family trusts, landowners, businesses, religious institutions,
cemeteries, nurseries, country clubs, and golf courses.

3

For a detailed discussion of conjunctive use projects see Foley-Gannon, Institutional
Arrangements for Conjunctive Water Management in California and Analysis of Legal
Reform Alternatives (2000) 6 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol’y 273; Robie &
Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A Groundwater Storage Program For the
California State Water Project (1979) 11 Pacific L.J. 41, 44-4.
4
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On January 2, 1962, WRD’s predecessor, the Central & West Basin Water
Replenishment District filed a complaint against over 500 parties for adjudication of
water rights and injunctive relief (“Complaint”). It was alleged that each defendant
extracted water from the Central Basin and that collectively defendants took too much
water. According to the Complaint, if the extractions continued at their then-current rate,
the groundwater level would be lowered, deeper wells would be necessary, and the
Central Basin would be flooded with sea water. The principal relief requested was “[t]hat
each Defendant who establishes the right to produce ground waters from the Central
Basin be permanently enjoined from extracting annually ground waters from the Central
Basin in an amount exceeding that quantity of water in acre feet determined by applying
its pro-rata percentage of all the rights to produce groundwater in the Central Basin as
determined by this Court, to the safe yield of the said basin as determined by this
4

Court . . . .” No relief was requested with respect to the use of the storage space in the
Central Basin.
The court entered the parties’ stipulated agreement as its judgment. The inter se
adjudication awarded water rights to 508 parties (which have since been consolidated in
148 entities). Each party’s annual pumping allocation was described and each party was
enjoined from overpumping absent specified conditions.
The judgment created a “carryover right” as follows: “In order to add flexibility to the
judgment and assist in the physical solution to the problems of Central Basin, each party
adjudged to have a Total Water Right or water rights and who, during a particular water
year, does not extract from Central Basin a total quantity equal to such party’s Allowed
Pumping Allocation for the particular water year, less any allocated subscription by such

4

“Safe yield” is defined as “the maximum quantity of water which can be withdrawn
annually from a ground water supply under a given set of conditions without causing an
undesirable result[,]” i.e. a gradual lowering of the groundwater levels. (City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 278.)
5
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party for purchase of Exchange Pool . . . is permitted to carry over from such water year
the right to extract from Central Basin in the next succeeding water year so much of said
total quantity as it did not extract in the particular water year, not to exceed ten (10%
percent of such party’s Allowed Pumping Allocation, or ten acre feet, whichever of said
ten percent or ten acre feet is the larger).”
The numerous findings of facts listed in the judgment include two related to the
storage of water. First, “[g]roundwater extractions from Central Basin are, and at all
times have been affected by common problems of storage, replenishment, quality and
supply among all persons extracting groundwater therefrom.” Second, the court found
that extraction of 80 percent of a party’s water right would “permit economical utilization
of the Central Basin and its preservation as a storage and reservoir facility.”
The court appointed a Watermaster to assist the court in the administration and
enforcement of the judgment. The Watermaster’s duties included implementing
measures to assure compliance with the judgment and preparing an annual report for the
court.
The court reserved jurisdiction and amended the judgment twice. The second
amendment modified the carryover provision to permit Pumpers to carry over 20 percent
of their allocated pumping allowance from year to year. The Second Amended Judgment
(Judgment), the operative judgment, reserves continuing jurisdiction unto the court “[t]o
provide for such other matters as are not contemplated by the judgment and which might
occur in the future and which if not provided for would defeat any or all of the purposes
of this judgment to assure a balanced Central Basin subject to the requirements of Central
Basin Area for water required for its needs, growth and development.”
Appellants’ Motion
Based on the reserved jurisdiction, on August 22, 2001, Appellants moved to
amend the Judgment to “more fully quantify[] and allocat[e] the rights of adjudicated

6
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water rights holders to use underground storage space in the Central Basin” (Motion).
5

Appellants estimated that approximately 645,700 acre feet of storage space is available
in the Central Basin.
The Motion proposed a single allocation of the unused storage space: the division
of the total usable storage space among the 148 Pumpers in direct proportion to each
extractor’s annual pumping allocation. Under the terms of the Motion, “[e]ach Pumper
would be allocated the right to use a portion of the total available unused storage space in
the Basin in direct proportion to that Pumper’s pro rata share of the total water rights in
the Basin.” “[I]f a Pumper holds 5% of the rights to extract water from the Basin, that
Pumper would also hold 5% of the available storage space in the Basin.” Appellants
argued that they were entitled to full use of the “available storage because they
collectively are entitled to all of its groundwater. . . .”
The amended judgment as proposed by Appellants included the following three
provisions:
1.

“Through the Restated Judgment, each Party is granted an expanded right

to Store Water in the Basin through an Allowed Storage Allocation . . . . The Allowed
Storage Allocation is quantified based on each Party’s right to Extract Water from the
Basin (their Total Water Right). Watermaster is authorized to regulate the use of the
allowed Storage Allocation.” The following formula was proposed: “Allowed Storage
Allocation = (Party’s Total Water Right)/(Sum of all Parties’ Total Water Right) *Total
allowed Storage Allocation.”
2.

“The Parties [the 148 entities with the right to pump water] collectively

shall have the right to use the Total Storage Space for reasonable and beneficial purposes,
subject to the terms and conditions of this Restated Judgment.” The “Total Storage

5

An acre foot is the amount of water that covers an acre of land one foot deep. An acrefoot is enough water to supply one or two households for one year.
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Space” is defined as “the maximum amount of available space in the Basin . . . in which
Water could be Stored or placed in Carryover for subsequent reasonable and beneficial
uses . . . .”
3.

“Allowed Storage Allocation, Carryover Credits, and Stored Water Credits

can be assigned, licensed, or leased individually and separately from a Party’s Allowed
Pumping Allocation. However, all Allowed Storage Allocation, Carryover Credits, and
Stored Water Credits associated with any quantity of Allowed Pumping Allocation shall
accompany and be transferred at the same time as a sale of that quantity of Allowed
Pumping Allocation. If a Party only sells a portion of an Allowed Pumping Allocation,
that Party shall retain the Allowed Storage Allocation, Carryover Credits, or Stored
Water Credits only in the amount associated with the amount of Allowed Pumping
Allocation retained.”
WRD’s Opposition To The Motion
WRD opposed the Motion, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. WRD
maintained that storage is separate and distinct from extraction. WRD also argued that
the proposed allocation interfered with its statutory powers and that the unused storage
space is a public resource.
The Watermaster Neither Supports Nor Opposes The Motion
The Motion proposed alterations to the powers of the Watermaster, increasing the
Watermaster’s responsibilities to include “regulat[ion]” of the storage space to ensure
that “(1) the Allowed Storage Allocation is exercised consistently with the terms and the
intent of the Restated Judgment, (2) Central Basin water quality is protected, and (3) the
Extraction and Storage rights of the Parties are not impaired.”

8
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The current Watermaster—the Southern District of the California Department of
6

Water Resources – indicated that it “neither supports nor opposes the merits of the
Motion.” In a declaration, Charles White, the Chief of the Southern District of the
Department of Water Resources, declared that “The Department supports expansion of
‘conjunctive use’ of groundwater and surface supplies as a cost-effective and
environmentally favorable means of improving water supply reliability.”
Trial Court’s Findings
In denying the Motion, the trial court found that the Judgment was limited to the
right to pump water from the basin and the right to pump is a “totally different issue”
from the right to put water in the basin. The court further concluded that the “right to use
subsurface space to store imported water in a groundwater basin is separate and distinct
right from the right to exercise an adjudicated groundwater right.” The court also
determined that WRD “has the statutory authority to replenish and store waters for
conjunctive use management.” Appellants timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS
Appellants contend that the Judgment reserves jurisdiction to consider the allocation
of storage rights in the Central Basin. Their principal argument is that the Motion
proposed a practical plan to utilize more effectively the unused underground storage
space and that the Pumpers are the most appropriate entities to benefit from conjunctively
using the space. For legal support, Appellants rely on the doctrine of mutual prescription
and on the carryover right described in the Judgment. Finally, Appellants vigorously
dispute WRD’s asserted managerial authority.
WRD challenges the court’s jurisdiction. In the alternative, WRD argues that the
Pumpers do not possess the subsurface storage space and cannot privatize the public

6

The Department of Water Resources is a state agency vested with authority over water
matters. (See §§ 120 et seq., 225 et seq.)
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resource. WRD also claims that several provisions proposed in the Motion interfere with
its statutory powers.
The City of Los Angeles, the Central Basin Municipal Water District, the Upper Los
Angeles River Watermaster, and the Main San Gabriel Watermaster filed amici curiae
briefs with this court. We consider the arguments raised by the amici curiae to the extent
those arguments are urged by either party or integrally intertwined with the issues raised
by the parties. However, we do not consider the issues raised by the amici curiae that
were not advanced by the parties. (California Assn. For Safety Education v. Brown
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1274 [“It is a general rule that an amicus curiae accepts a
case as he or she finds it.”].)
DISCUSSION
First, we consider jurisdiction, the threshold issue. Second, we summarize
applicable California water law. Then we discuss Appellants’ claims that they
collectively possess the storage space under the doctrine of mutual prescription and under
the Judgment. We also consider the relevant policies advanced by Appellants. Finally,
in the last section, we discuss the scope of WRD’s authority as it pertains to the Motion.
I.

Jurisdiction

Courts regularly affirm the expansive retention of jurisdiction in cases involving
water rights. (City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 937; City of
L. A. v. City of Glendale (1943) 23 Cal.2d 68, 81.) “The retention of jurisdiction to meet
future problems is regarded as an appropriate exercise of equitable jurisdiction in
litigation over water rights, particularly when the adjustment of substantial public
interests is involved.” (City of L. A. v. City of Glendale, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 81.) That
is exactly what happened here; the Judgment reserved jurisdiction to meet future
problems and adapt to changed circumstances.
Specifically, the court reserved jurisdiction “[t]o provide for such other matters as are
not contemplated by the judgment and which might occur in the future, and which if not
provided for would defeat any or all of the purposes of this judgment to assure a balanced
10
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Central Basin subject to the requirements of Central Basin Area for water required for its
needs growth and development.” The allocation of storage space falls within this broad
provision. The parties agree that the development of the unused storage space will
facilitate conservation and improve the reliability of the water supply for the region. Even
WRD acknowledges that several Pumpers “have a need for water that exceeds the level
of their ‘Allowed Pumping Allocation.’” Conservation of water and reliability of the
water supply are a matters of significant public interest and are of “transcendent
importance.” (Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara (1933) 217 Cal. 673, 702.)
The broad retention of jurisdiction in the Judgment differs substantially from the
limited retention of jurisdiction considered in Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Bear Valley
Mutual Water Co. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 363 and relied on by WRD. In Big Bear Mun.
Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mutual Water Co., the trial court interpreted a provision
limiting continuing jurisdiction to the “interpretation, enforcement or carrying out this
Judgment.” (Id. at p. 370, emphasis omitted.) The trial court found that the language
excluded any modification of the terms of the judgment. (Id. at p. 374.) Whereas the
Judgment in the present case retained expansive jurisdiction to provide for matters not
contemplated by the court, the judgment in Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. retained limited
jurisdiction only to interpret enforce or carry out the judgment. Because the language of
the two provisions are entirely different, Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. is inapposite.
The retention of jurisdiction here does not contravene the well established rule that a
court cannot adjudicate future water rights. (City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra supra,
33 Cal.2d at p. 937; Orange County Water District v. City of Colton (1964) 226
Cal.App.2d 642, 648-649.) Under this rule, even though the prospective reasonable
beneficial uses of an overlying owner are protected, the specific quantity of water
necessary for prospective uses cannot be determined until the need arises. (Tulare Dist .
v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, 525.) This rule is inapplicable here
because the allocation of storage space requires “no declaration as to future rights in

11
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water [or storage space] to which a party has no present right.” (City of Pasadena v. City
7

of Alhambra supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 937.) Jurisdiction over the Motion is proper.
II.

Water Rights Under California Law

To place Appellants’ Motion in proper context, we summarize the governing law.
A.

The Storage Space In The Central Basin Is A Public Resource

The California Constitution mandates the use of all water resources in a manner
8

consistent with the interest of the people. Article X, section 2 (formerly article XIV,
section 3) requires that: “the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable method of use
of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be exercised with a
view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the
public welfare.”
The purpose of the constitutional amendment was to ensure that the state’s water
resources would be “available for the constantly increasing needs of all of its people.”
(Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424, 449.) This
broad constitutional provision encompasses “the use of all of the water within the state.”
(Modesto Properties Co. v. State Water Rights Board (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 856, 860.)
It is applicable to “the settlement of all water controversies” (Miller & Lux v. San
Juaquin L. & P. Corp. (1937) 8 Cal.2d 427, 435), and to surface storage. (Meridian,

7

Appellants also rely on a provision in the court’s reservation of power enabling the
court to adjust the “permissible level of extractions from Central Basin in relation to
achieving a balanced basin and an economic utilization of Central Basin for groundwater
storage . . . .” This reservation of jurisdiction, however, relates specifically to
determining the level of extractions, not the storage allocation.
8

The parties agree that the unused storage space in the Central Basin is a public resource.
Ignoring the general rule that amici curiae must take the case as they find it, several amici
curiae vigorously disagree. Because the amici curiae’s argument is intertwined with the
issues raised by the parties, we consider the issue on the merits.
12
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Ltd. v. San Francisco, supra, 13 Cal.2d at pp. 449-450.) Subsurface storage, which is
akin to a natural reservoir (City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p.
76), also falls within this broad provision.
The same policy described in article X, section 2 – that water resources must be
9

10

used in the public interest -- is expressed in several statutes. (§ 100 § 105. ) Most
significantly, under section 105, underground water resources must be developed “for the
greatest public benefit.” In short, the parties’ statement that the subsurface storage space
is a public resource is amply supported by the Constitution and Water Code.
B.

The Right To Water Is Usufructuary

At least since 1928 when the predecessor to article X section 2 of the Constitution
was adopted, there is no private ownership of groundwater. (State of California v.
Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App. 4th 1019, 1023, 1025.) The State of California owns
all of the groundwater in California, not as a proprietary owner, but in a manner that
empowers it to supervise and regulate water use. (Id. at pp. 1022, 1026.) Water rights
holders have the right to “take and use water,” but they do not own the water and cannot
waste it. (Id. at p. 1024.)

9

That statute provides: “because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general
welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be
exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the
people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or
from any natural stream or watercourse in this State is and shall be limited to such water
as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not
and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or
unreasonable method of diversion of water.”
10

That statute provides: “It is hereby declared that the protection of the public interest in
the development of the water resources of the State is of vital concern to the people of the
State and that the State shall determine in what way the water of the State, both surface
and underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit.”
13

SB 331841 v1:006774.0096

A person obtains a right to extract groundwater by owning specific land, by
appropriating water (City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 925
(City of Pasadena)), or by inheriting a pueblo right. (Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v.
Borror (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 742, 751.) Ownership of land appurtenant to groundwater
engenders an “overlying right.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 925.) Under
the “correlative rights doctrine,” “as between the owners of land overlying strata of
percolating waters, the rights of each to the water are limited, in correlation with those of
others, to his ‘reasonable use’ thereof when the water is insufficient to meet the needs of
all. [Citations.]” (Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water Dist. (1974) 37
Cal.App.3d 924, 934.) An appropriative right is based on the taking of groundwater.
(Ibid.) Pueblo rights apply to municipal successors to Mexican and Spanish pueblos.
(Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 751.)
Where an appropriation of water is wrongful, open, notorious, continuous for the
statutory period of five years, hostile, and adverse it may mature into a prescriptive right.
(City of Pasadena, supra,. at pp. 925-926.) Like other water rights, prescriptive rights are
“artificial creatures of law.” (Orange County Water District v. City of Colton, supra, 226
Cal.App.2d at p. 646.) “To perfect a claim based upon prescription there must, of course,
be conduct which constitutes an actual invasion of the former owner’s rights so as to
entitle him to bring an action.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 927.) The
scope of a prescriptive right depends on what was obtained in an open, notorious,
continuous manner. (Cf. Connolly v. McDermott (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 973, 977
[considering a prescriptive easement].)
C.

Mutual Prescription

City of Pasadena, supra, 33 Cal.2d 908, developed the later-named doctrine of mutual
prescription. Similar to the 1965 adjudication in this case, City of Pasadena involved
litigation to determine how much water each extractor could pump from a basin without

14
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further exacerbating a developing overdraft.

(Id. at p. 916.) All but one party, the

California-Michigan Land and Water Company, stipulated to a judgment that included
the following critical stipulation: “‘all of the water taken by each of the parties to this
stipulation and agreement, at the time it was taken, was taken openly, notoriously and
under a claim of right, which claim of right was continuously and uninterruptedly
asserted by it to be and was adverse to any and all claims of each and all of the other
parties joining herein.’” (Id. at p. 922.)
Focusing on the fact that, even though the entities continued to extract water from the
basin, some water remained in the basin, the California-Michigan Land and Water
Company argued that there was no injury, an element of prescription. (Id. at p. 928.)
The court rejected the argument, reasoning that “[t]he pumping by each group . . .
actually interfered with the other group in that it produced an overdraft which would
operate to make it impossible for all to continue at the same rate in the future.” (Id. at p.
931.) Although the parties could have continued extracting water from the basin, the
continued pumping interfered with the future ability to extract water and accordingly,
satisfied the invasion element of prescription. (Id. at p. 932.) The Supreme Court
applied the principle of mutual interference to bind all of the basin’s pumpers.
After finding mutual interference, the court considered which entities were required to
reduce their extractions. With little analysis, the court concluded that a proportional
reduction was more equitable than an elimination of certain uses of water. (Id. at p. 933.)
“A pro tanto reduction of the amount of water devoted to each present use would
normally be less disruptive than total elimination of some uses.” (Id. at p. 933.) Thus,

11

An accumulated overdraft is the aggregate amount of groundwater removed from a
basin which exceeds the quantity of nonsaline water replaced in the groundwater basin.
(See § 60023[defining accumulated overdraft in a basin governed by WRD].) Annual
overdraft is the amount of ground water removed in a given water year that exceeds the
supply of nonsaline water replaced therein. (Cf § 60022 [defining annual overdraft in a
basin governed by WRD].)
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the court upheld a proportional allocation, wherein each party had the right to use some
amount of water from the basin in proportion to that party’s prescriptive right.
The use of a proportional apportionment to allocate extraction rights subsequently
was limited in City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199 (City of
San Fernando).) In City of San Fernando, the high court questioned “mechanically”
allocating water and found that such allocation “does not necessarily result in the most
equitable apportionment of water according to need. A true equitable apportionment
would take into account many more factors.” (14 Cal.3d at p. 252.) The court never
enumerated the “many more factors,” but, in a footnote, cited Nebraska v. Wyoming
(1945) 325 U.S. 589, 618 which, in the context of a water dispute among states, listed the
following factors as illustrative: “physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use
of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the
extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of
wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former . . . .” (City of San
Fernando, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 265-266, fn. 61.)
City of San Fernando involved, among other things, a dispute whether the City of Los
Angeles could recapture water it imported and stored in a groundwater basin even though
the water was not specifically traceable. (City of San Fernando, supra,14 Cal.3d at pp.
255-256.) The court upheld the right of the city to recharge artificially the basin and to
recapture the water it imported. (Id. at p. 264.) “The purpose of giving the right to
recapture returns from delivered imported water priority over overlying rights and rights
based on appropriations of the native ground supply is to credit the importer with the
fruits of his expenditures and endeavors in bringing into the basin water that would not
otherwise be there.” (Id. at p. 261.) However, the court declined to consider any further
allocation of storage rights, because “there [did] not appear to be any shortage of
underground storage space in relation to the demand therefore.” (Id. at p. 264.) The City
of San Fernando court relied on City of L. A. v. City of Glendale (1943) 23 Cal.2d 68, 76,
16
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where the City of Los Angeles’s right to use the water it stored in the San Fernando
Valley was upheld.
More recently, the Supreme Court harmonized City of Pasadena and City of San
Fernando. “City of San Fernando distinguished City of Pasadena, supra, 33 Cal.2d 908,
where a ‘restriction to safe yield on a strict priority basis might have deprived parties who
had been using substantial quantities of groundwater for many years of all further access
to such water.’ [Citation.]” (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th
1224, 1246-1247.) “Case law simply does not support applying an equitable
apportionment to water use claims unless all claimants have correlative rights; for
example when parties establish mutual prescription. Otherwise, cases like City of San
Fernando require that courts making water allocations adequately consider and reflect the
priority of water rights in the basin.” (City of Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1248.)
III.

Mutual Prescription Does Not Apply To The Storage Space

Relying on City of Pasadena, supra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 931-933, Appellants argue the
Pumpers’ right to the total unused storage space was created by the doctrine of mutual
prescription. According to Appellants, “[t]he proposed proportional allocation of storage
rights would follow the same format set forth in the ‘mutual prescription’ doctrine by
providing equal priority shares of the total allocated storage in proportion to each party’s
existing allocation of production and carryover rights. Accordingly the proposal is a
legally sound, equitable, and rational method to allocate rights to store water among the
parties.”
We disagree with Appellants’ statement for two reasons: (1) there is no evidence
that the Pumpers satisfied the elements of mutual prescription; and (2) the mechanical
equitable apportionment used in City of Pasadena is not applicable here.
A.

Mutual Prescription

The doctrine of mutual prescription applies only if the use of the claimed right was
actual, open, notorious, hostile and adverse to the original owner and continuous for the
statutory period. (City of Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 12451.) Appellants bear the
17
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burden of establishing each element, and have failed to demonstrate any one. (Pleasant
Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th 742, 784.) The Motion concerned
unused property that by definition was not continuously used in an open, notorious, and
hostile manner.
Appellants do not argue that they appropriated water for storage. Nor do
Appellants argue that they appropriated storage space for water by physically storing
water in the Central Basin (putting aside the carryover right to which we shall return).
Without appropriation, there is no prescriptive right. (See Tehachapi –Cummings County
Water Dist. v. Armstrong (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 992, 1000.) Without prescription, there
is no mutual prescription.
B.

Equitable Apportionment

In City of Pasadena, the court affirmed a proportional allocation to avoid the
elimination of any present use. (City of Pasadena, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 933.) The
circumstances in this case warrant no similar concern because the Motion involved only
unused storage space, which by definition does not tread upon current uses. Appellants’
assume that a proportional allocation is necessarily equitable, the “mechanical”
assumption criticized in City of San Fernando and held inapplicable in City of Barstow
unless the parties rights are either correlative or based on mutual prescription, doctrines
that do not apply here. (See also Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country
Club, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1723, 1734, fn. 11.)
Appellants claim that “the right to use storage space [is] an element of their water
rights.” If that were correct, it would follow that a prescriptive right to water necessarily
encompasses a right to storage. However, Appellants water rights are based on
prescription, which in turn, is based on and limited to the property actually used. (Cf.
Connolly v. McDermott, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 977 [considering a prescriptive
easement].) Appellants prescriptive interest is in “the use of the water, not in the storage
space.” (In re Application U-2 Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District
(Neb. 1987) 226 Neb. 594, 610.)
18
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IV.

The Judgment Does Not Grant Appellants A Storage Right

Appellants rely on the Judgment and judgments from other basins to argue that they
collectively have the right to all of the unused storage space. Specifically, Appellants
argue that (1) storage of water is linked to extraction, a right already given to the
Pumpers under the Judgment; (2) their carryover right is tantamount to a storage right;
and (3) judgments in other basins correctly award storage rights to the entities authorized
to extract water from those basins. As we shall explain, even assuming the correctness of
Appellants’ predicate facts, the conclusion they seek – possession of all of the unused
storage space – does not follow.

19
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A.

Linkage of Storage And Extraction Rights

Appellants argue that the proportional allocation is appropriate because storage and
extraction are hydrologically linked, a contention supported by the record, case law, and
12

also advanced by the amici curiae.

Appellants, however, cite no law that generally

holds that a legal interest in one right results in an interest in all “linked” rights, or that
more specifically holds that the right to store water attaches to the right to extract water
from a groundwater basin. If Appellants’ theory were correct, adjacent property owners
would have more control over their neighbors than nuisance law affords them, easement
owners would have more control over the dominant tenement than property law affords
them, and end water users would have more control over water extraction than water law
affords them. (See e.g. Gdowski v. Louie (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1408; Scruby v.
Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702-703; State of California v.
Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) Extraction and storage are different
physical processes; establishing a hydrologic link between them is not sufficient to show
that a legal interest in one creates an interest in the other. (Indeed, it is undisputed that
while WRD has authority to store water, it has no authority to extract water.)
In a related claim, Appellants argue that “[a]s a practical matter” they are best
positioned to use the storage space because they already possess wells. According to
Appellants, it is “logical” to grant them the right to use the storage space because they are

12

For example, it is the extraction of water from the basin that creates the storage space.
A furlough of extraction augments the supply of water in storage. The cost to Appellants
of extraction is also linked to the amount of water in storage because the cost of pumping
water depends on the distance the water must be lifted. Storage capacity is a component
of determining the safe yield, which in turn influences the permissible level of extraction.
(Allen v. California Water and Tel. Co. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 466, 475.) In addition, the
quality of extracted groundwater is affected by the quality of water stored in a
groundwater basin. (Foley-Gannon, Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water
Management in California and Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives, supra, 6 Hastings
W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y at p. 280.)
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the only entities who can extract water from the Central Basin. Appellants appeal to
“common sense,” arguing that common sense requires “groundwater production be
managed in a coordinated fashion along with the use of storage space . . . .”
Appellants’ reliance on common sense and practicalities are unpersuasive as
indications of existing legal rights. Justice Mosk’s concern that “‘[c]ommon-sense’ is in
the eye, or mind, of the beholder” (Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 47
Cal.3d 473, 485, diss. opn. Mosk, J.) is heightened where, as here, Appellants’ claim is
that common sense supports a legal right for which there is no legal authority. Although
courts have applied “common sense” in interpreting the meaning of a statute, (see id. at
pp. 477-485), Appellants cite no cases where courts have relied only on “common sense”
or practicalities to award water or property rights.
B.

Carryover Rights

The carryover provision permits the Pumpers to carryover a limited amount of
their allotted water right and store it for a fixed period of time. According to the
Watermaster, “[t]his flexibility was necessary to meet unforeseen emergencies in water
demand.” Appellants emphasize the carryover provision, identifying it as a carryover
storage provision and underscoring the physical result of carrying over water:
“[u]npumped groundwater that is ‘carried over’ occupies physical ‘storage’ space in the
Basin.” Appellants estimate that if all Pumpers exercised their carryover right 45,000
acre feet of storage would be used.
To the extent Appellants are arguing their right to use 45,000 acre feet of storage
space results in the right to use all of the storage space, that argument suffers from the
same problems as their “linked” argument. One right does not automatically engender
another even if they are interrelated. Pumpers’ limited right to carryover their annual
pumping allocation, assuming it is aptly characterized as a storage right, does not confer a
greater right to utilize storage space in addition to that granted in the carryover provision.
Appellants may be understood to argue that the carryover provision facilitates in
lieu conjunctive use of the Central Basin. They assert that “[m]odern conjunctive use
21
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practices are built upon ‘in lieu’ storage, which is made possible by carryover.”
Appellants further state (with no support) that “[i]n-lieu storage is likely to be the most
efficient and economic means of storing water in the Central Basin because it relies on
existing water distribution infrastructure . . . .” At most, Appellants have shown that
increasing the amount of water that can be carried over from year to year might create
incentives for the Water Rights Holders to purchase surface water in lieu of pumping
from the Central Basin. However, the Motion sought to allocate all of the unused storage
space, not merely to increase the Pumpers’ carryover rights.
C.

Judgments In Other Basins

Finally, Appellants and several amici curiae describe and emphasize the allocations
of storage space developed and implemented in other California groundwater basins. The
trial court judgments from other basins are irrelevant to the issues in this case. The
judgments are not persuasive or binding authority.
“It is the policy of the law to discourage litigation and to favor compromise and
voluntary settlements of doubtful rights and controversies, made either in or out of
court.” (Central Basin etc. Wat. Dist. v. Fossette (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 689, 705.)
Parties may agree to a solution that “‘waives or alters their water rights in a manner
which they believe to be in their best interest.’” (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water
Agency, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1238 [quoting and approving Court of Appeal
observation].) The agreements reached by parties in other basins are not helpful to
understanding the rights of the parties in the Central Basin within existing legal
frameworks.
V.

The Proportional Allocation Aspect Of The Storage Motion Does Not
Guarantee Beneficial Use
In their Motion, Appellants advanced a single proposed allocation: each Pumper

would be entitled to a pro rata share of the total usable storage space in proportion to the
Pumper’s allocated right to extract water in a manner where the storage space rights
could be freely transferred. Appellants explain that “[a] market for Basin water rights
22
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currently exists in which Water Right Holders can sell or lease rights that exceed their
present demand. [Citation.] Similarly, those that possess storage allocation in excess of
their needs could sell or lease their surplus. Thus, each entity that has historically relied
on the Basin would receive benefit from the use of Central Basin’s storage space, while
simultaneously ensuring that the resource is used by those entities that value it most.”
Appellants’ proposal fails to ensure that the storage space will be used for the
public benefit. The proportional allocation ignores the priorities of water use set by the
Legislature, which declare that the use of water for domestic purposes as the highest and
the use for irrigation as the second priority. (§ 106; see also Prather v. Hoberg (1944) 24
Cal.2d 549, 562 [“Without question the authorities approve the use of water for domestic
purposes as first entitled to preference.”].) Further, Appellants’ proposal ensures only
that the Water Rights Holders would benefit from the exploitation of the storage space,
either by using it or by selling it to the highest bidder. As Appellants conclude, under
their proposal, “each entity that has historically relied on the Basin would receive benefit
from the use of Central Basin’s storage space. . .” The Constitution requires that the
public benefit as well by mandating that the use of water resources be consistent with the
interest of the people and for the public welfare.
Appellants recognize the constitutional mandate and argue that granting the
Motion is consistent with the constitutional mandate because the proportional allocation
would result in public accountability and would lead to greater efficiency. We discuss
the claims separately.
A.

Public Accountability

Relying on one consultant’s statement, Appellants argue that the Pumpers are
directly accountable to the “consumers who put Central Basin water to beneficial use.”
Similarly, in its amicus curiae brief, the City of Los Angeles argues that municipalities
are directly accountable to the public. There is some support for the claim that
municipalities are well positioned to respond to the future needs of their residents as the
City of Los Angeles argues. (Baldwin v. County of Tehema (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 166,
23
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13

178; § 106.5. ) However, the proposed proportional allocation applies regardless of
whether the Water Right Holder is accountable to the public and therefore provides no
safeguard for the public. In addition, the Motion permits the Pumpers to sell their storage
rights to “those entities that value it most” without any guarantee that the “entities that
value it most” also are accountable to the public.
B.

Efficiency

In developing public resources for the greatest public benefit, efficiency is one
relevant factor. (§ 109, subd. (a) [“The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the
growing water needs of the state require the use of water in an efficient manner and that
the efficient use of water requires certainty in the definition of property rights to the use
of water and transferability of such rights.”].) Efficiency is not, however, synonymous
with reasonable or beneficial use; “the most efficient use of water [resources] is not
necessarily its most beneficial or reasonable use.” (Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Bear
Valley Mutual Water Co., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 363, 378.) To be consistent with the
Constitutional mandate, the use of storage space must be exercised “with a view to the
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare.” (Cal. Const., art. X, § 2.) Even assuming Appellants’ have demonstrated their
proposal would result in greater efficiency, a statement based only on the opinion of
14

Appellants’ consultant, that is not enough to satisfy the Constitutional mandate. (Big

13

Section 106.5 provides: “It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this State
that the right of a municipality to acquire and hold rights to the use of water should be
protected to the fullest extent necessary for existing and future uses, but that no
municipality shall acquire or hold any right to waste water, or to use water for other than
municipal purposes, or to prevent the appropriation and application of water in excess of
its reasonable and existing needs to useful purposes by others subject to the rights of the
municipality to apply such water to municipal uses as and when necessity therefore
exists.”
14

Appellants rely on the opinion of Rodney Smith, the president of a water supply
development company and the senior vice president of a consulting firm, who states that
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Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mutual Water Co., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 363,
378.)
Embedded within Appellants’ efficiency claim is a request for clearly defined
water rights, a prerequisite for an efficient market. The request for definition is
understandable in light of the deleterious effects of uncertainty. “Initially, [uncertainty]
inhibits long range planning and investment for the development and use of waters in a
stream system. . . . [¶] Uncertainty also fosters recurrent, costly and piecemeal litigation.”
(In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 355.) The need
for clear definition, however, supports no particular allocation including that proposed by
Appellants.

VI.

WRD Is Authorized To Manage The Storage Space In The Central Basin

For reasons we shall explain, WRD has authority to store water for conjunctive
use and has authority to manage the storage space in the Central Basin.
WRD is expressly authorized to store water for the purpose of replenishing the
15

district.

(§ 60221, subd. (e).) Storing water for replenishment purposes is essentially

allocating storage rights to the Pumpers will promote the marketability of water rights,
reduce transaction costs, and foster cooperative development. Transaction costs “are the
aggregate costs incurred as part of the transfer process that can be apportioned to buyers,
sellers, state or local agencies and institutions, and third parties.” (Kaiser, Texas Water
Marketing In The Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis (1996) 27 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 181, 211.)
For a discussion of marketing water rights compare Gregory, Groundwater and Its
Future: Competing Interests and Burgeoning Markets (1992) 11 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 229,
248-252 with Crammond Leasing Water Rights For Instream Flow Uses: A Survey Of
Water Transfer Policy, Practices, And Problems In The Pacific Northwest (1996) 26
Envtl. L. 225, 246-255; see also Bloomquist, Heikkila, & Schlager [Institutions and
Conjunctive Water Management Among Three Western States] (2001) 41 Nat. Resources
J. 653.)
15

The WRD enabling legislation does not expressly define the term replenish. In the
context of groundwater, the term replenish has specialized meanings: (1) “spreading
25
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the same as storing water for conjunctive use. The Judgment defines “‘Artificial
Replenishment’ [as] the replenishment of Central Basin achieved through the spreading
of imported or reclaimed water for percolation thereof into Central Basin by a
governmental agency.” This form of artificial replenishment involves forcing surface
water into underground basins by artificial recharge just as the artificial recharge
conjunctive use projects described by Appellants. Because there is no meaningful
distinction between storing water for replenishment purposes and storing water for
conjunctive use, WRD’s authorization to store water for replenishment purposes includes
conjunctive use projects.
The Legislature also granted WRD authority to “manage and control water for the
beneficial use of persons or property within the district.” (§ 60221, subd. (e).) This
broad power necessarily encompasses management of at least some portion of the storage
space because the water WRD is authorized to manage and control is located in the
basin’s storage space. The plain meaning of the statute governs where the language is
unambiguous. (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) Here, the plain
language of the statute grants WRD management authority.
The Legislature also authorized WRD to manage in-lieu replenishment projects
when it expressly permitted WRD to “fix the terms and conditions of any contract under
which producers may agree voluntarily to use replenishment water from a nontributary
source in lieu of groundwater, and to that end a district may become a party to the
contract and pay from district funds that portion of the cost of the replenishment waters
as will encourage the purchase and use of that water in lieu of pumping so long as the
persons or property within the district are directly or indirectly benefited from the

water over a permeable area for the purpose of allowing it to percolate to groundwater
basins or aquifers, or otherwise addition water to groundwater basins or aquifers” (§§
121-322, 131-322, and 137-316 ) or (2) “spreading water over a permeable area for the
purpose of allowing it to percolate to the groundwater basin, or otherwise adding water to
the groundwater basin which without such effort would not augment the groundwater
supply.” (§§ 119-317, 124-315, 128-317, 129-317, 135-317.)
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resulting replenishment.” (§ 60230, subd. (p).) The record suggests that WRD exercises
this authority to engage in in-lieu replenishment projects similar to those yearned for by
Appellants. According to the Watermaster’s October 2000 report, “[d]uring the 19651966 water year, WRD began a program of in-lieu replenishment. . . . [¶] The program
may be used to: alter pumping patterns within a groundwater basin; replenish areas of
low transmissivity where conventional recharge techniques are ineffective; heighten the
effect of injecting water to form a sea water barrier by reducing extractions in the
vicinity; reduce the amount of replenishment water purchased by WRD; and reduce the
annual extraction from a groundwater basin . . . .”
WRD’s power is not unlimited. WRD conceded at oral argument that the Water
Rights Holders have an interest in the natural replenishment and an interest to ensure that
any imported water does not harm the basin. In addition, as Appellants point out, section
60230, subdivision (f) prohibits WRD from duplicating operations of other agencies,
suggesting that WRD’s authority is not exclusive, an issue we need not further resolve in
the context of this case.
In challenging WRD’s authority, Appellants argue that because WRD is required,
on an annual basis, to evaluate the basin and decide what quantity of water to purchase
for replenishment purposes, (§ 60315, subd. (a)), WRD’s authority is limited to
replenishing the annual overdraft. Appellants’ reasoning makes no sense in light of the
fact that the same statute that requires WRD to make findings with respect to the annual
overdraft also requires WRD to make findings with respect to the accumulated overdraft
(§ 60315, subd. (d)). There is no support for Appellants’ claim that the findings WRD is
required to make are coextensive with WRD’s powers.
Finally, Appellants argue that, under section 60051, WRD’s interest is subordinate
to their own. Section 60051 provides: “No language or provision in this division shall be
interpreted or construed so as to limit, abridge or otherwise affect the water or water
rights of any existing agency or person or affect the rights of existing agencies or persons
with respect to any legal proceeding pending on May 1, 1955, wherein any water or water
27
SB 331841 v1:006774.0096

right or the protection thereof is involved; provided, however, that nothing in this section
shall be construed to limit the provisions of subdivision (7) of Section 60230 of this
division.” Appellants have not shown that the finding that WRD has authority to manage
the storage space “limit[s], abridge[s] or otherwise affect[s] the water or water rights of
any existing agency or person . . . .” As explained above, Appellants do not have the
rights, which they now claim are abridged, and therefore section 60051 does not assist
16

them.

CONCLUSION
The Motion is the genesis of this case and establishes the framework for the
parties’ arguments and our review. Our holding is limited to sole allocation proposed by
Appellants in the trial court – an allocation of the total usable storage space to the
Pumpers, with each Pumper entitled to a share proportional to his, her, or its allocated
water right. WRD does not argue, and we do not hold, that the Pumpers are precluded
from using the Central Basin storage space. We hold only that Appellants’ right to
extract water from the Central Basin does not create a concomitant right to store water in
the Central Basin.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
COOPER, P.J.
We concur:

16

The parties and amici vigorously dispute the applicability of Niles Sand and Gravel
Co., Inc. v. Alameda County Water Dist., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 924. We do not find that
case to assist in the construction of WRD’s authority because it considered the role of a
water district organized pursuant to section 30000, the County Water District Law. (Id. at
p. 929 fn. 5, 937.)
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RUBIN, J.
BOLAND, J.
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SANTA MARIA VALLEY WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
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V.
CITY OF SANTA MARIA, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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San Luis Obispo County Superior Court
Can Nos. 990738 and 990739

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS AND
ACTIONS CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL
PURPOSES

PARTIAL STATEMENT OF DECISION
RE TRIAL PHASE III

17
18

SANTA MARIA GROUNDWATER
LITIGATION
Lead Case No. CV 770214
(CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES)

20
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Plaintiff Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation District seeks declaratory relief as
follows:

23

1. A declaration that no defendant holds prescriptive rights to underground water.

24

2. A declaration that the Appropriators within the District (non-overlying owners) may

25

only extract water that is surplus to the water rights of overlying owners. The court is

26

requested to determine the aggregate amount of surplus water available for

27

Appropriators and to make orders curtailing the taking of water from surplus if the

28

amount of surplus water declines.
PARTIAL STATEMENT OF DECISION RE TRIAL PHASE III

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

3. A declaration that defendants are not entitled to return flows from State Water Project
imported water.
4. A declaration that there is no right to recapture State Water Project water stored in the
basin through in lieu recharge.
5. A declaration that there is no right to recapture State Water Project water stored in the
basin through direct recharge (injection wells).
6. Injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from causing an overdraft by limiting their
extractions based on any future diminution of surplus.
Cross-complainants are as follows:

10

Apio Land Co., et al. seeks declaration of rights, quiet title and inverse condemnation.

11

Nipomo Community Services District, et al. seeks declaratory relief and a physical

12
13
14

solution to future over-pumping.
ConocoPhillips and Tosco Corp., et al. seek declaratory and injunctive relief and claim a
right to the reasonable and beneficial use of the water underlying its land.

15

Small Landowners group, et al., seeks declaratory relief and inverse condemnation.

16

Landowners Group, et al. seeks declaratory relief, quiet title and inverse condemnation.

17

Glad-A-Way Gardens, et al. seeks declaratory relief, quiet title and inverse

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

condemnation.
PH Property Development, et al. cross complains seeking declaratory relief and inverse
condemnation.
Rural Water Company, et al. claims prescriptive rights and a declaration of the same as
well as a declaration of entitlement to Twitchell water.
Northern Cities (Arroyo Grande, Pismo, Grover Beach, and Ocean Community Services)
claim prescriptive rights and also seek a physical solution.

25

The City of Santa Maria, et al. cross complains seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,

26

requesting a determination that it has obtained prescriptive rights to the Basin water on the

27

ground that the basin has been in overdraft for more than 5 years and that if pumping continues

28

at the current rate the Basin water supply will be exhausted. Santa Maria claims it has acquired
2
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1

prescriptive rights by pumping continuously since 1900. Other causes of action relate to

2

purported municipal priority under Water Code Section 106.5. Santa Maria also seeks a remedy

3

against Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation District for failure to exercise its duty to

4

regulate water use within the Basin, to recapture its right to return flows from imported water, to

5

establish its right to Twitchell Reservoir water, for an equitable apportionment of waters in the

6

Basin, and to enjoin waste by overlying owners.

7

Southern California Water Co., et al. brings a cross-complaint for declaratory relief

8

seeking a finding that the Basin has been in overdraft for more than five years ant that it has

9

acquired prescriptive rights. It also seeks injunctive relief and a water management plan for the

10

Valley.

11

Stated in the broadest of terms, the pleadings of all parties require the court to determine

12

the rights of the parties to the use of water within the underground basin known and described as

13

the Santa Maria Valley or Santa Maria Valley groundwater basin (hereinafter referred to as the

14

“Basin”).

15

Rather than naming each of the parties and their respective positions in the discussion

16

below with regard to this phase, the court will categorize those parties seeking prescriptive

17

rights as Appropriators and will refer to the parties opposing prescription as Landowners (and

18

will include the Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation District (hereinafter “SMVWCD”) in

19

the Landowner category).

20

If an underground water basin is in overdraft, an appropriator of water may acquire

21

priority rights if all the other elements of prescription are present. If the basin is not in overdraft,

22

but no surplus exists, the court may be required to intervene to establish the rights of the parties

23

seeking to use the water within the basin, or to protect it from overuse (even by overlying

24

landowners). A determination of overdraft or its absence assists the court in determining the

25

rights to the reasonable and beneficial use of the water within the basin when there are

26

competing claims to the use of the water by land owners or appropriators, or both. Because of

27

the emphasis the parties placed on the issue of prescriptive rights, the court directed that the

28

parties present evidence on the question of whether the Basin has been in overdraft in a separate
3
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1

early phase of the trial. The trial on that phase commenced on October 8, 2003. Appearances of

2

counsel are set forth in the record.

3

Oral and documentary evidence was introduced by the respective parties, and the matter

4

was argued and submitted for decision. The court, having considered the evidence, having heard

5

the arguments of counsel and being fully advised, issues the following partial statement of

6

decision based upon the evidence presented regarding the issue of Basin overdraft.

7

Summary of Decision

8

The court finds based on all the evidence presented in this phase of the trial that the

9

Basin is not presently and has not historically been in a state of hydrologic overdraft.

10

The law defines “overdraft” as extractions in excess of the safe yield of water from the

11

aquifer, which over time will lead to a depletion of the water supply within a groundwater basin

12

as manifested by permanent lowering of the water table. City of Los Angeles v. City of San

13

Fernando (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 199, City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal. 2d at p.

14

929, Orange County Water District v. City of Riverside (1959) 173 Cal. App. 2d 137. Safe yield

15

is the amount of annual extractions of water from the Basin equal to the amount of water needed

16

to recharge the groundwater Basin and maintain it in equilibrium, plus any temporary surplus.

17

Temporary surplus is defined as that amount of water pumped from an aquifer to make room

18

underground to store future water that would otherwise run off into the ocean or otherwise be

19

wasted. Safe yield cannot be determined by looking at the groundwater Basin in a single year

20

but must be determined by evaluating the Basin conditions over a sufficient period of time to

21

determine whether pumping rates will lead to eventual permanent depletion of the water supply.

22

Recharge must equal discharge over the long term.

23

Fernando, supra, 14 Cal. 3rd at 278-279.

City of Los Angeles v. City of San

24

The Landowner parties have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Basin is

25

not, and has not been, in overdraft. The Appropriators have failed to prove by clear and

26

convincing evidence, (see discussion infra) or even by a preponderance of the evidence, either

27

that (1) reliable estimations of the long-term extractions from the Basin exceed reliable

28

estimations of the Basin’s safe yield, or (2) physical evidence of overdraft in the Basin permits an
4
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1

inference that extractions have exceeded safe yield.

2

But a determination of whether or not the basin is in overdraft is only one aspect of the

3

determination of whether or not a party has acquired a priority to underground water. There are

4

more claims and contentions in this case than simply a claim of prescriptive rights. Many parties

5

have prayed for prospective injunctive relief, in the form of a physical solution or otherwise.

6

Other parties have sought the court’s assistance in obtaining separate, sub-basin management of

7

portions of the overall basin. While the evidence presented during the Phase III trial is sufficient

8

for the court to determine that the Basin has not been, and is not, in a state of hydrologic

9

overdraft, the evidence in Phase III is not sufficient for the court to resolve other issues presented

10

by various parties’ declaratory and injunctive relief claims, which issues therefore must be

11

adjudicated in further phases of this litigation. The court must still determine, inter alia, whether

12

any parties have acquired prior rights to the use of water within the aquifer based upon their

13

creation of the water supply, or assuming that there is presently only a small surplus of water

14

within the basin (even if not in overdraft), whether future rights are in jeopardy.

15

Burden of Proof

16

Overdraft within a ground water basin, if proved, is an element that may establish

17

prescriptive rights in an appropriator against an overlying owner, assuming all the other elements

18

needed to establish the claim are also proved. However, even without prior overdraft, if there is

19

no surplus and an appropriator takes water from the aquifer that an overlying water user would

20

have a prior right to use, the appropriator may acquire prescriptive rights if all the other elements

21

necessary to acquisition of the right are present.

22

While the Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation District is the Plaintiff in this case and

23

accordingly has the burden of proof on all issues raised by the complaint, the Appropriators bear

24

the burden of prove of all the elements of their prescriptive claims. The case law consistently

25

places the burden of proof upon the proponent of an adverse possession claim. (See, e.g., Field-

26

Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 235.) Cases involving prescriptive water-right

27

claims are particularly clear in this regard, holding that the proponent bears the burden

28

irrespective of whether prescription is asserted by the plaintiff in the complaint or by the
5
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1

defendant in a responsive pleading. (Morgan v. Walker (1933) 217 Cal. 607, 608, 615 (plaintiff

2

asserting prescriptive right); Central and West Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. Southern Cal.

3

Water Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 891, 909 (defendant asserting prescriptive right); Pleasant

4

Valley Canal Co. v. Borror (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 742, 784 (defendant asserting prescriptive

5

right); Hahn v. Curtis (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 388–89 (defendant asserting prescriptive right).

6

Demonstrating adversity requires proving that the claimant’s water use deprives a senior

7

right holder of water: “A use is not adverse unless it deprives the owner of water to which he or

8

she is entitled.” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra, 14 Cal.3d 199, 281-282.)

9

(citing City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 927)); (City of Barstow v.

10

Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1241 (“an appropriative taking of water which is

11

not surplus is wrongful and may ripen into a prescriptive right”).

12

In attempting to gain prescriptive rights in the Basin, the Appropriators must do more than

13

meet the usual “preponderance of the evidence” standard that applies in most civil cases.

14

Prescription claims must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. (Weller v. Chavarria

15

(1965) 233 Cal. App. 2d 234; Field-Escandon v. DeMann (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 228, 235;

16

Applegate v. Ota (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 702, 708.)

17

Nature of the Evidence for Determining Overdraft

18

The Appropriators themselves selected the methods and the evidence whereby they

19

attempted to prove overdraft.

The court did not define overdraft or attempt to limit the

20

introduction of evidence to any particular definition or scientific or legal approach to the issue,

21

but rather indicated to all the parties that it would base a definition on the various decisions of the

22

California Supreme Court and appellate courts that have considered the issue of overdraft.

23

For the reasons detailed below, Appropriators have not established by any standard of

24

proof either the Basin’s safe yield or that long-term extractions from the Basin have exceeded any

25

such safe yield so as to manifest overdraft conditions. The court is satisfied both from the law

26

and the evidence that overdraft can be determined, for purposes of resolving the Appropriators’

27

prescriptive-right claims, by evidence of observed physical conditions in the Basin, such as

28

declining underground water levels, seawater intrusion, declining water quality, or land
6
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1

subsidence over time and by the testimony of expert witnesses who have testified as to the

2

conditions within the basin.

3

The court is persuaded that evidence of such undesirable results, or in this case the entire

4

absence of such undesirable results, along with credible evidence of stable or surplus conditions,

5

is sufficient to establish that the Basin is not in overdraft. With regard to the nature of the

6

evidence offered at trial, none of the several hydrogeology experts who testified disputed that

7

physical conditions such as those noted above are the type of “undesirable results” of excessive

8

extractions from a groundwater supply that indicate a condition of overdraft. In fact, each expert,

9

whatever his or her party affiliation, devoted a substantial amount of testimony to the asserted

10

presence or absence of just such conditions. It is clear from the evidence that experts in the field

11

of hydrogeology can and routinely do base their conclusions concerning groundwater basins,

12

including the presence or absence of overdraft, on physical evidence of long-term lowering of

13

groundwater levels, seawater intrusion, land subsidence and the like.

14

Moreover, there is no evidence that recent changes in use in the Basin have so altered the

15

patterns of recharge and water use that the Basin has recently become in a state of overdraft but

16

that the undesirable results of this condition have not yet manifested themselves. Experts for the

17

appropriators have testified that in their opinions the basin has been in overdraft for most of the

18

last half century based solely on estimates of extraction and recharge of water

19

not supported by the physical evidence. If the Basin had been in overdraft for the last fifty-three

20

years, one would expect to see evidence of the consequences of such overdraft of such a long

21

duration. In these circumstances, evidence of the Basin’s physical condition is sufficient to

22

resolve whether or not the long-term historical condition of the Basin supports the Appropriators’

23

claims of overdraft.

That opinion is

24

Appropriators’ Argument Concerning Calculation of Overdraft

25

The Appropriators have contended the absence of negative physical conditions in a Basin

26

is never sufficient to determine whether the Basin is overdrafted. On a single year basis, the court

27

would agree with that proposition. But, when the physical conditions have remained essentially

28

static in excess of fifty years, following consistent patterns of discharge and recharge, the court is
7
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1

satisfied it can draw conclusions about overdraft.

2

Appropriators contend that it is impossible to make any determination whatsoever

3

regarding overdraft for any purpose, in any factual setting, without a numerical determination of

4

safe yield. Prescriptive-right claims to underground water turn on whether the claimants’

5

invasion of his or her rights was adverse and thus may be determined based on what conditions

6

property owners can observe or what knowledge they may have. In this case, that might mean

7

whether or not the Basin’s physical condition demonstrated that the pumping of others was

8

depriving Landowners of water.

9

impossible to make any determination of overdraft for any purpose without the Landowners

10

proving the amounts and the reasonableness of their groundwater pumping, and thus quantifying

11

one portion of the demands on the Basin.

12

Landowners must prove their affirmative defense of self-help (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water

13

Agency (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1241, 1253) before the Appropriators prove any element of their

14

prescriptive claims. Moreover, as discussed below, even if it were necessary to quantify safe

15

yield in order to determine the issues presented for trial in this phase of the case, the

16

Appropriators failed to meet their burden of proof on this issue with credible evidence.

The court rejects the Appropriators’ contention that it is

That argument incorrectly suggests that the

17

Landowners presented credible evidence of a water budget confirmed by an independent

18

change in storage calculation. This budget showed a modest surplus in supply over a reasonable

19

base period, and was further supported by a peer review.

20

However, the fact that the court can resolve the Appropriators’ prescriptive-right claims

21

based on overdraft without calculating the Basin’s safe yield does not make such a calculation

22

irrelevant to future phases of this case. The parties have requested relief the determination of

23

which lies beyond the Phase III issues and requires additional phases of trial. Moreover, the court

24

recognizes that it may have an independent duty in the future to consider a physical solution in

25

some circumstances. See City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 316,

26

339-341.)

27

While there may not be current manifestations of overdraft, it is possible, given

28

population growth, agricultural and industrial changes, that the Valley is at risk of being in
8
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1

overdraft in the future. During the entire historical period presented populations increased within

2

the Valley and water use changed in a variety of ways. There has been a shift in some areas to

3

urban uses and away from agriculture. The nature of the agricultural uses has changed as well.

4

The type of irrigation used by farmers has become more efficient and less water is needed with

5

more efficient uses of water. But there has also been an increase in agriculture in the Valley in

6

substantial numbers.

7

generations as well was future generations that the water resources within the Basin be managed

8

prudently. Absent actual physical evidence of overdraft, a determination of safe yield is the sine

9

qua non to the court determining whether future extractions from the Basin exceed safe levels

10

either annually or over the long-term; without establishing the “bench mark” of safe yield the

11

court could not fashion the relief the parties seek in future phases of this case or fully adjudicate

12

their rights inter se, nor could the court be confident of the proper management of the Basin in the

13

future, upon which the value of any such rights directly depends. All of these things are

14

important reasons for the court to determine the safe yield of the Basin.

More of such changes will occur and it is important to both present

15

The Appropriators also contend that some sources of recharge should be excluded from

16

the Basin’s safe yield. Except for the determination of how dependable a source might be,1 the

17

source of water recharging a basin should not generally be material to a determination of

18

whether the Basin is in hydrologic overdraft. If the court were to exclude Twitchell, Lopez, and

19

the California Water Project imported water in determining whether there is an overdraft, the

20

court would be looking at the Basin in a hypothetical sense2 as opposed to whether there has

21

been real depletion of the water supply in the Basin. Because prescriptive-right claims turn on

22

the assertion that a Landowner should have known that the claimant was improperly interfering

23

with the Landowners’ rights, it is the physical reality that the Landowner can observe that is key

24

to determining whether the facts show that prescription has occurred. Landowners cite City of

25

Los Angeles v. the City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 199, in support of their position that

26

1

27

2

28

Allen v. California Water and Telephone Co., (1946) 29 Cal. 2d 466.

Hypothetical overdraft (or, as counsel for the City of Santa Maria contends, “legal overdraft”) may have no
relevance for purposes of determining prescriptive rights because hypothetical overdraft may not give notice of an
open, notorious and hostile taking of water whose use belongs to another.
9
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1

all sources of supply count in the assessment of overdraft. The finding by the trial court in that

2

case was based upon a referee’s finding of fact and the parties conceded the overdraft finding.

3

The issues on appeal related to the allocation of water within the basin. It was clear there was

4

an overdraft, with or without non-native water.

5

On the other hand, in Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 466, the

6

California Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a varying supply to the Tia Juana River

7

watershed required the ongoing monitoring of a small amount of supply from a dam on the

8

Mexico side of the border to determine the safe yield and any surplus that might be available for

9

appropriation. In enumerating the factors to be considered in computing net safe yield, the

10

Court’s decision plainly contemplates the inclusion of this developed supply along with other

11

sources. Id. at 476.

12

Ultimately, if a municipality is entitled to a priority in using water from particular sources

13

that is stored in the Basin, that priority is preserved irrespective of whether the court considers it

14

in determining whether or not there is an overdraft. Similarly, if there is an overdraft in the

15

Basin, prescriptive rights would be determined based on all water, and except for the immunity

16

against prescriptive loss of water rights granted by statute to public entities,3 all of the water in

17

the Basin would be subject to both prioritization and determination of both prescriptive and other

18

rights.

19

Moreover, as with the question of analyzing Basin conditions, the technical evidence

20

introduced in this case supports a determination that all sources of supply should be taken into

21

account for purposes of analyzing overdraft. Evidence was presented that engineers who engage

22

in such analyses routinely include all sources of supply; this evidence was not contradicted.

23

While the methods of engineers do not bind the court, no legal or practical obstacle has been

24

shown that prevents accepting these methods for purposes of determining the issues in this phase.

25

The court finds in this instance that overdraft must be analyzed by taking into account all sources

26

of supply to the Basin.
The Appropriators also contend that Twitchell Reservoir water is not a reliable source of

27
28

3

Civil Code Section 1007.
10
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1

recharge to the Basin because of sedimentation that potentially reduces the water conservation

2

pool within the reservoir, and which will further reduce capacity over time. As that capacity is

3

reduced, the amount of water available for recharge into the Basin would also be reduced.

4

The court finds that the Twitchell Reservoir has been a reliable source of water in the past.

5

The governing body for the reservoir, SMVWCD, has demonstrated that it is aware of the

6

sedimentation problem and, as it has in the past, is taking steps to mitigate the situation so that

7

Twitchell will continue to be a source of recharge to the Basin. The court need not make a final

8

determination of what role Twitchell may play in a subsequent allocation of the waters of the

9

Basin until future phases of this proceeding.

10

Appropriators’ Expert Evidence

11

The Appropriators’ experts have provided opinion testimony of what constitutes safe

12

yield for purposes of determining overdraft.

Mr. Foreman opined that safe yield is

13

approximately 136,000 plus acre-feet per year based upon the so-called unimpaired conditions,

14

that is, without Twitchell, Lopez or imported water and based upon the so-called impaired or

15

historical conditions, his opinion is that safe yield is 149,000 plus acre-feet per year. Under

16

either scenario, Mr. Foreman opined that pumping had exceeded those safe yield estimates, and

17

thus concluded that the Basin is and has been in overdraft for many years.

18

Mr. Foreman in-put his associates’ discharge and recharge estimates into the Modflow

19

computer groundwater flow model and used the model to determine recharge from the northern

20

boundaries and outflow to the ocean. He further testified that he calibrated the model and that it

21

validated his opinions.

22

But as the subsequent testimony of Dr. Dennis Williams established,4 the computer

23

model must achieve internal convergence as to each cell in the model. Only after convergence

24

has been established, may it then be calibrated by measuring its output against known data and

25

making adjustments to the data. A model that does not converge, therefore, cannot be calibrated

26

and completely lacks credibility.

27
4

28

Dr.Williams initially testified to Mr. Foreman’s August model and later testified similarly as to each model that
Mr. Foreman subsequently prepared, including his January 2004 model.
11
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Recalled to testify in January, Mr. Foreman testified that using Surfact in January he was

2

successful in obtaining convergence but that he was still unable to achieve convergence using

3

the Modflow model. It was his opinion that he did not need Modflow convergence so long as he

4

had Surfact convergence. However, as Dr. Williams’s testimony established, and which the

5

court finds credible, convergence with Surfact is only valid if convergence is also obtained

6

inputting the same data used in Surfact into the Modflow model. That did not occur.

7

To the extent that the information put into the model is only an estimate, the

8

conclusions reached by the model are also only estimates with a substantial margin of error. To

9

the extent that the model validates the estimates, they nevertheless remain estimates. To the

10

extent that the model does not achieve convergence it cannot be calibrated and an uncalibrated

11

model lacks credibility.

12

Even setting aside the problems with model convergence, however, the models Mr.

13

Foreman offered did not accurately simulate observed conditions.

Significant calibration

14

problems were observed related to the inconsistency in the model’s simulation of Basin geology

15

compared to actual, observed geologic properties. Landowners’ experts also testified as to

16

unrealistic simulations of observed water levels, especially coastal water levels, which call into

17

question the ability of the Appropriators’ models to accurately represent observed conditions.

18

Finally, Mr. Foreman’s groundwater models, as noted above, provided important in-put

19

to his water budget. By his own testimony, Mr. Foreman relied upon the models to corroborate

20

his water budget. However, Mr. Foreman could not corroborate with real water level data either

21

his model’s, or his water budget’s determination that pumping had exceeded his safe yield

22

values for his selected base period. Significantly, his water budget was not properly compared

23

to a calculation of the Basin’s change in storage over the time period encompassed by the water

24

budget. Instead, Mr. Foreman relied on his model for this purpose. However, as noted above,

25

an uncalibrated model lacks credibility.

26

The court is not persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the Basin historically

27

was or is in overdraft. If the court were to apply a lesser standard of proof by a preponderance

28

of the evidence, the decision would be the same.
12
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Landowners’ Expert Evidence

2

The court is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence presented by Landowners

3

that, based on all sources of ground water recharge, the Basin is not presently in a state of

4

overdraft, nor has it been historically. Evidence presented by the Landowners is that well levels

5

are at near or above historical highs following precipitation. None of the indicators of overdraft

6

are present.

7

Water levels in the aquifer have fluctuated greatly since recorded rainfall and well data

8

have been kept. But there has been no permanent loss of storage in the aquifer and the water

9

levels in the Basin as a whole, while falling during dry periods, rebound during wet periods. A

10

normal cycle in the Valley consists of extended periods of dry years followed by an abundance

11

of precipitation that brings water levels back to historically high levels. Water levels, quite

12

naturally, fluctuate among the various areas within the Valley as does precipitation and

13

pumping.

14

If the Basin had been in overdraft for the last fifty-three years, one would expect to see

15

evidence of the consequences of such overdraft of such a long duration. All the physical

16

evidence is to the contrary. Monitoring wells reflect no serious depletion or lowering of water

17

levels, other wells in the Valley are at normal levels, water quality remains good, and there is no

18

evidence of subsidence. No evidence of seawater intrusion, land subsidence, or water quality

19

deterioration that would be evidence of overdraft has been presented. Some wells in the

20

Nipomo Mesa area do show lowering of water levels that may result from a pumping depression

21

or other cause, and there may be some effects in that portion of the Basin that are not shared

22

Basin-wide, but that is not sufficient in any event to demonstrate Basin-wide overdraft.

23

Furthermore, as noted above, Landowners also presented credible evidences of a water

24

budget-confirmed independent change in storage calculation that showed a modest surplus in

25

supply over a reasonable base period. The court therefore concludes based on all the evidence

26

that the Basin is not, and has not been, in overdraft.

27

Appropriators’ prescriptive-right claims based on a condition of overdraft. While actual physical

28

evidence of overdraft is not necessary to a finding that there is overdraft in the Basin, such

This conclusion disposes of the

13
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1

evidence may have provided some element of credibility to the Appropriators’ “water budget”

2

analysis; however, none was presented.

3

Sub-Areas

4

Some of the Appropriators presented evidence in order to obtain a finding from the court

5

that certain areas of the Basin should be considered to be sub-basins or sub-areas for purposes of

6

determining the issues in this phase of the case. In particular, Nipomo Community Services

7

District presented evidence asserting that the Nipomo Mesa area should be considered a sub-basin

8

and that that sub-basin is overdrafted.

9

The court finds that these Appropriators did not establish by credible evidence, under any

10

standard of proof, that sub-basins or sub-areas were in a condition of overdraft. The court does

11

affirm its previous finding that the Basin is a single hydrogeologic unit for purposes of the

12

determinations of overdraft in this phase of the case. The court reserves any decision on how the

13

basin should be managed, including whether there should be sub basin management, to

14

subsequent phases of the trial.

15
16
17

DATED: ______________________
HON. JACK KOMAR
Judge of the Superior Court
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Adjudicated Groundwater
Basins in California
The State of California is not authorized by the
California State Water Code to manage
groundwater. California landowners have a
correlative right to extract as much groundwater as they can put to beneficial use. In some
basins, that correlative right has been defined
by a court. In other basins, the correlative right
has not yet been defined. Groundwater management programs have usually been developed on an ad hoc basis in response to local
initiative through local agencies, adjudication,
and districts formed by special legislation. Two
additional methods have recently become
available: 1) AB 3030 (Water Code Section
10750 et seq) allows certain existing local
agencies to manage groundwater; and 2) city
and county ordinances. This Water Facts
explains groundwater management by adjudication. For information about other types of
groundwater management, please consult other
Water Facts.

Water Facts are short reports on water
resources issues of general interest. They
are published periodically by the California
Department of Water Resources and can be
obtained free by contacting DWR Bulletins &
Reports, P.O. Box 942836, Sacramento,
CA 94236-0001; 916/653-1097.

In some groundwater basins in California, the land
owners or other parties turn to the courts to settle
disputes over how much groundwater can rightfully
be extracted by each land owner. The courts study
the available data to arrive at an equitable distribution of the groundwater that is available each year.
This court-directed process can be lengthy and
costly, although some of these cases have been
resolved with a court-approved negotiated settlement, called a stipulated judgment. Unlike overlying and non-overlying rights to groundwater, such
decisions guarantee each party to the decision a
proportionate share of the groundwater that is
available each year.
In these adjudicated groundwater basins (see
pages two and three), the court appoints
Watermasters to oversee the court judgment. In 14
of these basins the court judgment limits the amount
of groundwater that can be extracted by all parties to
the judgment. The basin boundaries are also defined
by the court and generally do not include an entire
basin as defined in DWR Bulletins 118 and 118-80.
Water users in Santa Margarita River watershed are
required to report the amount of surface water and
groundwater they use, but groundwater extraction is
not restricted. Puente Narrows is an addendum to the
Main San Gabriel adjudication that requires a
minimum underflow from Puente Basin to Main San
Gabriel Basin of 588 acre feet per year.
(continued on page 4)
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Adjudicated Groundwater Basins and Watermasters in California
Court Name

Filed in
court

Final
Decision

Watermaster

1—Scott River Stream System

1970

1980

2 local irrigation districts

2—Santa Paula Basin

1991

1996

3-person Technical Advisory Committee from
United Water CD, City of Ventura, and Santa
Paula Basin Pumpers Association

3—Central Basin

1962

1965

DWR—Southern District

4—West Coast Basin

1946

1961

DWR—Southern District

5—Upper Los Angeles River Area

1955

1979

An individual hydrologist appointed by
Superior Court

6—Raymond Basin

1937

1944

Raymond Basin Management Board

7—Main San Gabriel Basin

1968

1973

9-Member Board elected from water purveyors
and water districts

1972

1972

2 consulting engineers

8—Puente

1985

1985

3 consultants

9—Cummings Basin

1972

1972

Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District

10—Tehachapi Basin

1973

1973

Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District

11—Mojave Water Agency

1990

1996

Mojave Water Agency

12—Warren Valley Basin

1976

1977

Hi-Desert Water District

13—Chino Basin

1978

1978

5 people, Chino Basin Municipal
Water District

Puente Narrows, Addendum to Main
San Gabriel Basin decision

Not yet appointed, operated as part of
Chino Basin

14—Cucamonga Basin
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15—San Bernardino Basin Area

1963

1969

One representative each from Western
Municipal Water District of Riverside & San
Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District

16—Santa Margarita River Watershed

1951

1966

U.S. District Court appointee

Relationship to DWR Bulletin 118-80
Basin Name; County

This table (pages two and three) lists the court’s name for the
adjudicated portion of the groundwater basin first, followed by
the Watermaster and the basin name and number used in
DWR's Bulletins 118 and 118-80.

No.

Scott River Valley; Siskiyou

1-5

Sub-basin of Santa Clara River, Ventura Couty

4-4

Northeast part of Coastal Plain of Los Angeles
County Basin; Los Angeles

4-11

Southwest part of Coastal Plain of Los Angeles
County Basin; Los Angeles

4-11

San Fernando Valley Basin(entire watershed);
Los Angeles

4-12

Northwest part of San Gabriel Valley Basin;
Los Angeles

4-13

San Gabriel Valley Basin, excluding Raymond
Basin; Los Angeles

4-13

San Gabriel Valley Basin, excluding Raymond
Basin; Los Angeles

4-13

Cummings Valley Basin; Kern

5-2

Tehachapi Valley West Basin and Tehachapi
Valley East Basin; Kern

5-28,
6-45

Lower, Middle & Upper Mojave River Valley
Basins; San Bernardino

6-40,
6-41,
6-42
7-12

1

910

Part of Warren Valley Basin; San Bernardino

Northwest part of Upper Santa Ana Valley
Basin; San Bernardino and Riverside

8-2

North central part of Upper Santa Ana Valley
Basin; San Bernardino

8-2

Northeast part of Upper Santa Ana Basin;
San Bernardino and Riverside

8-2

The entire Santa Margarita River watershed,
including three groundwater basins: Santa
Margarita Valley, Temecula Valley and Cahuilla1
Valley Basins; San Diego and Riverside.

9-4,
9-5,
9-6

1

Locations of
Adjudicated
Groundwater
Basins
in California.
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2 5 6 14
78 15 12
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16

The numbers on this
map indicate the
locations of adjudicated groundwater
basins in California.
They correspond to
the numbers by the
court name for the
adjudicated basins
listed in the first
column on page two.

In Bulletin 118-80, Cahuilla Valley (9-6) is spelled differently.
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For most basins, the court has defined a fixed value
for the safe yield. Extraction may exceed this value
during some years as a part of the operating range
that is allowed in the judgment. Adjudicated groundwater basins in California, their appointed Watermasters, the year the cases were filed, and the year
the decision became final are shown in the table on
pages two and three. The court’s name for the
adjudicated portion of the basin is listed first, followed by the basin name used in DWR Bulletins
118 and 118-80.

quality are inseparable, Watermasters are recognizing that they must also manage for quality. The
Watermaster for Main San Gabriel Basin returned to
the court in 1990 asking for authority to limit extractions to help prevent the spread of contaminants and
to expedite remediation. The court granted that
authority and in 1991 approved Main San Gabriel
Basin Watermaster’s regulations for implementing
such authority. Similar water quality authority was
granted to the Upper Los Angeles River Area
Watermaster in 1993.

Although adjudication of groundwater basins has
resulted in a reduction of the amount of groundwater
that is extracted, the total amount of water consumed
has continued to increase. As a result, agencies in
most adjudicated basins have imported surface water
or are looking for water to import to meet the
increased demand.

Adjudication of a groundwater basin is one method
of regulating groundwater extraction and allocating
costs of replenishment. The Legislature has created
ten groundwater management agencies that can pass
ordinances to regulate groundwater extraction and
has authorized some groundwater replenishment
fees in 22 other types of water agencies. This authority is discussed in the California State Water Code.
A detailed discussion of groundwater management
agencies is contained in Water Facts, Number 4,
Groundwater Management Districts or Agencies in
California.

The original court decisions provided Watermasters
with the authority to regulate extraction of the
quantity of groundwater; however, they omitted
authority to regulate extraction to protect water
quality or to prevent the spread of contaminants in
the groundwater. Because water quantity and water

Where do you get more information?
For further information on groundwater management in California, contact any one of the following
California Department of Water Resources' offices:
Northern District
2440 Main Street
Red Bluff, CA 96080

916/529-7323

Southern District
770 Fairmont Avenue
P.O. Box 29068 (91209-9068)
Glendale, CA 91203-1035

Central District
3251 "S" Street
Sacramento, CA 95816-7017

916/322-7164

Division of Local Assistance 916/327-8861
1020—9th Street
P.O. Box 942836 (94236-0001)
Sacramento, CA 95814

San Joaquin District
3374 E. Shields Avenue
Fresno, CA 93726

209/445-5481
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818/543-4600
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